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Vietnam
Too Little -- Too Late
What Could Have Been
Could the Vietnam conflict have ended in victory instead of defeat?
It is my belief that we could have won the military action in South Vietnam had the photo intelligence training that took place in the mid 1960s was in place four to five years earlier.
The Photo Interpreters (or Imagery Analysts) responsible for analyzing photography taken over Vietnam and Laos were not trained to correctly analyze what they were seeing. They were trained to identify conventional military activity -- a feature totally missing in South Vietnam. In late 1961 few people in government, including President Kennedy, were considering the role of unconventional warfare as a coming problem for the United States.
What intelligence analysts were seeing on Southeast Asian photography was unconventional warfare, which could only be identified through observing subtle changes in the environment. American intelligence analysts did not have the geographic background that allowed them to recognize these changes. A second problem that compounded this problem was the lack of coordination between intelligence organizations in the field and units back in Washington.
A visit to Vietnam in 1964 by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and DIA Deputy Director, John Hughes, triggered a series of events that added the missing pieces to the intelligence puzzle, as well as improving coordination with Washington. I played a role in bringing these changes about. This paper will illustrate my part in this change.
In 1957 I was working in photographic intelligence as an analyst working on training manuals - Photographic Interpretation Keys - that were used by military intelligence analysts to identify images on photography that they were not familiar with. These keys covered a broad range of categories, ranging from geographic locations such as China, Yugoslavia, Korea, and individual items of military equipment such as Tanks, Artillery, Tactical Aircraft, to name a few. My work -- up to 1963 when I joined the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) contingent in the National Photographic Intelligence Center (NPIC) -- included work on 23 individual Photographic Interpretation Keys.
When Deputy Director Hughes returned to Washington after the Vietnam trip, he contacted each of the services intelligence organizations and put Sec/Def McNamara's following request to them. John asked them to go to Saigon, review the holdings of the SVN intelligence units, collect what can be used and return to Washington. Then they were to produce a Photographic Interpretation Key (training manual) to identify the insurgent activity in Vietnam. This key was to be published in English and Vietnamese and be in the hands of the troops in Vietnam before Christmas. Each of the intelligence units told John that it was not possible to produce the training manual in that short a time frame. All three elements, Army, Navy, and Air Force, turned down the request.
John then came to the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) a joint CIA/DIA intelligence unit. He surveyed the DIA employees to determine who had the needed experience for this project. Two individuals came to the top of the list. Don Wolden and myself (Tom Farrell) -- two individuals whose careers had been connected since 1957. John explained what he needed and we agreed to take on the assignment. A month later we were on a plane for Saigon, Vietnam and the start of a series of projects that would continue for the next three and a half years.
With Don in charge the two of us, accompanied by Major Walt Lindsey, arrived in Saigon. We spent four weeks reviewing holdings of photography, visiting intelligence units, and talking to field personnel. We returned to Washington with several boxes of photography and documents and a Vietnamese intelligence officer. The Secretary of Defense's office found space for our team in the US Army Photographic Interpretation Center (USAPIC) at Ft Holabird in Dundalk, Maryland, a suburb of Baltimore. This was an organization Don and I both had worked for prior to our assignment to NPIC. We added one other DIA employee after we had determined the individual assigned to our project by USAPIC was not committed to a team effort. The second week in December we had English copies as well as Vietnamese copies, printed, bound, and ready for distribution to the troops. The deadline was met two weeks early.
JUSTIFICATION FOR RECOMMENDATION
FOR PRODUCTION OF
VIETNAM PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION KEY
THOMAS N. FARRELL
The period of special service on which Recommen- dation is based is 1 June – 1 December 1964, during which time Mr. Farrell together with a DIA associate, assumed prime responsibility for the production of a Photo Interpretation Key on a highly critical area of current combat interest, on which the requirement for such a “Key” was of the utmost urgency. Materials of this category on the area in question, were non-existant, thereby prompting a “crash” type of priority for its accomplishment.
During the period involved, Mr. Farrell's contribution to the final result were of such standard in terms of dedication, application to accuracy of detail, and overall effort as to make possible a product of extremely superior quality, prepared in a fraction of the time normally required of much larger crews operating under much more ideal circumstances.
Involved in the accomplishment of the task assigned to Mr. Farrell was a tout of temporary duty in the area of combat operations, during which essential materials were acquired under severest handicap and with a minimum of assistance. This provided the basis on which the final results were dependent and was accomplished in such outstanding fashion as to insure the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the final product.
Through the outstanding contribution of Mr. Farrell, proceedures were established and monitorship maintained over progress of the project to the extent that a superior product was completed and published in a six-month period. This time element compares with periods amouting from one to two years for the preparation of Keys of much the same format and content, by crews of considerably greater number, working under ideal circumstances. The expeditious completion of this project represents a conservation of valuable man-hours and government expenditure. It also insures that great benefit will be derived by U.S. combat personnel in the area in terms of safety and economy.
In addition to the superior manner in which his personal efforts were applied toward accomplishment of the required associated tasks, it was necessary that Mr. Farrell maintain liaison with foreign nationals and members of service organizations in order to insure adequate coordination of effort. This was accomplished in exceptional fashion and resulted in working relations which contributed immensely to the success of the project.
During the period on which this recommendation is based, Mr. Farrell's entire attitude of dedication and his application of effort, far in excess of required standards of performance, reflected great credit upon himself and DIA, and is largely responsible for the production of a DIA product of superior quality.
KEYS ON LAOS and THAILAND
Several months after the manual was distributed, DIA received a request from the US Ambassador to Laos, William Sullivan, for a similar key on Laos. There was a problem in separating the insurgents from the various tribal groups in Laos. Our group traveled to Laos, talked with intelligence personnel, and returned with material to use in the project.
On the way to Laos we stopped in Bangkok, Thailand and saw on Thai TV that there was a low level problem with insurgency along the Thailand/ Laos border. After working on the Vietnam Key we were aware of the need to get an early start assessing the cultural features of a country before the Insurgents moved in. With this uppermost in our minds we sent a memo to John Hughes. John in turn contacted the Director of DIA, and the Secretary of Defense. Out of this came a joint DOD, State Department, and Thailand Government project for a Key on Thailand printed in both Thai and English.
A three-man field team was sent to Thailand for a seven-week, full country collection and survey. We had the use of CIA aircraft, and helicopters. The Ambassador's C-47 and the Air Attaché as pilot, Thai Liaison officers, and any other assets we required. Our Thai contact was General Chomanand Kriangsak, head of the Thai General Staff, who was responsible for approving all US Forces assigned to Thailand. General Kriangsak became Prime Minister several years later.
Our team traveled over 7,000 miles in Thailand covering the entire country. Eighty-four, 36 exposure rolls of black and white photography were exposed and forty-two rolls of color were taken. Six hours of tape recordings were made. We returned to Washington and were allowed, for the first time, the use of NPIC facilities. This came about because all team members held the required security clearances for the building.
Another Key was produced in record time.
There is a strong possibility that the key on Thailand was instrumental in controlling the insurgency in that country. We do know, that if we had the Vietnam Key a few years earlier, it would have been possible to target and eliminate the insurgency before it became a full scale military action, as it did. I still have much of the field collection photography from Thailand, which was never classified, and travel orders and other documents. I have several papers which chronicles the activity over the three and one-half years we worked on the projects. Don Wolden and John Hughes both have passed away. I would like to get this public before I join them.
This is a story that deserves to be told.
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